Santiago R.R.
2017-10-12 13:15:20 UTC
(Moving this thread from tor-relay)
equivalent to me, although the relay weights may be different.
is to write a tor proposal. Having a concrete design could help with
analysing the anonymity implications as well.
I think IPv6-only relays are a lower priority than better IPv6 and dual-stack
client support, and IPv6-only bridge support But we could do both in the
same release.
Hello tor-dev,
With my colleague JC Bach (in CC), we have proposed a last-year student
project to address IPv6-related issues in Tor for the upcoming semester,
at IMT Atlantique engineering school. There will be two students working
on it. It is hard to say now how far we will arrive, especially because
this is our first approach to Tor entrails.
So this message is to say we have good chances to come back here looking
for help :-)
Cheers,
-- Santiago
On Tue, 3 Oct 2017 09:53:46 -0400
I can't help but feel you are overcomplicating this.
Clients create a circuit by randomly picking 3 nodes out of the all-nodes
pile, right? If all 3 happen to be IPv6-capable, then the circuit can go over
IPv6 and all is fine. If some of the 3 happen to be IPv6-only while others are
IPv4-only, the whole selection can be thrown away and repeated.
That way IPv6-only relays could get some usage on a totally random basis, with
no compromises and no restraining "of the next hop based on the previous one",
not hurting anonymity. Clients just need to know which nodes are IPv4-only,
IPv6-only or dual-stack, to not attempt unworkable combinations, discarding
them instead.
Discarding unworkable combinations and restraining node choices seemFor interposing dual-protocoled nodes along the way, how many do there
have to be for it to become "not too limiting"?
This is one of the questions we need researchers to answer.have to be for it to become "not too limiting"?
Clients create a circuit by randomly picking 3 nodes out of the all-nodes
pile, right? If all 3 happen to be IPv6-capable, then the circuit can go over
IPv6 and all is fine. If some of the 3 happen to be IPv6-only while others are
IPv4-only, the whole selection can be thrown away and repeated.
That way IPv6-only relays could get some usage on a totally random basis, with
no compromises and no restraining "of the next hop based on the previous one",
not hurting anonymity. Clients just need to know which nodes are IPv4-only,
IPv6-only or dual-stack, to not attempt unworkable combinations, discarding
them instead.
equivalent to me, although the relay weights may be different.
And as there are more and more dual-stack or IPv6-only relays, the "throw
away" step will be needed less and less often.
If you think this will work and is safe for client anonymity, then the next stepaway" step will be needed less and less often.
is to write a tor proposal. Having a concrete design could help with
analysing the anonymity implications as well.
I think IPv6-only relays are a lower priority than better IPv6 and dual-stack
client support, and IPv6-only bridge support But we could do both in the
same release.
With my colleague JC Bach (in CC), we have proposed a last-year student
project to address IPv6-related issues in Tor for the upcoming semester,
at IMT Atlantique engineering school. There will be two students working
on it. It is hard to say now how far we will arrive, especially because
this is our first approach to Tor entrails.
So this message is to say we have good chances to come back here looking
for help :-)
Cheers,
-- Santiago