[tor-dev] prop279 global wildcard '*' exploits

[nullius]

At https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24774#comment:5 ,

I'm not sure that the sandboxing section is necessary. We should say
that _all_ plugins should only access the network over Tor, unless they
are using some comparably strong anonymity mechanism. [...]

In reply https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24774#comment:6

The proposal as written states under §3.2, specifically discussing

Perhaps we trust the name plugin itself, but maybe the name system
network could exploit this?

What does this mean? Is there any specific information on what
potential exploits the spec authors have thought of? '''Would
requiring Tor-only connections prevent these potential exploits?''' I
should ask on `tor-dev`.

Per the discussion in the current version of the spec (686aaf1), there
is concern that a '*' plugin may try to resolve ordinary DNS names. But
this separate, quoted statement assumes a trustworthy plugin, which I
take to mean that it would not grab .com, etc.

So, what was the concern behind that statement? (And are there any
other potential exploits, which may or may not be prevented by requiring
name resolution through Tor?)